Repetition plays a significant, productive role in the work of both Derrida and Deleuze. But the difference between these two philosophers couldn't be greater: it is the difference between negation and affirmation, between Yes and No. In Derrida, the productive energy of repetition derives from negation, from the necessary impossibility of supplementing an absence. Deleuze recognizes the kind of repetition which concerns Derrida, but insists that there is another, primary form of repetition which is fully positive and affirmative. I will argue that there is nothing in Derrida's philosophy to match the affirmative, primary form of repetition articulated by Deleuze. Moreover, it is precisely this difference that accounts for the most exciting features of Deleuze's work: the possibility of breaking through to the other side of representation, beyond authenticity and inauthenticity, becoming-becoming.
Explicating Heidegger's and Irigaray's critiques of difference, this essay proposes a new approach to the crucial concept of relationship in their thought. Articulated as proximity rather than difference, such relationality works in a manner that is non-appropriative and free from power. The essay shows that at the center of Heidegger's questioning of being is not the ontico-ontological difference but the notion of nearness (Nähe), elaborated by Heidegger as a critique of the metaphysical logic of difference and relation. Linking Heidegger's nearness with his critique of power in the recently published Besinnung, the essay explains how such relationality exceeds the parameters of power (machtlos). The remainder of the essay investigates the way in which Irigaray's reformulation of sexual difference as an ethics of proximity similarly calls into question the differential economy of being and aims at a new model of non-appropriative relation. While Heidegger links the change in relation from power to letting be to a decisive confrontation with modern technicity, Irigaray criticizes this approach and reformulates the question of technology through the prism of sexual difference. By taking into account the often ignored aspects of Irigaray's thought - temporality, event, proximity - the essay situates Irigaray's ethics and culture of sexual difference not only beyond the discussions of essentialism but also outside the equality-difference debates.
The concept of death is of special importance in Schopenhauer's metaphysics of appearance and Will. Death for Schopenhauer is the aim and purpose of life, that toward which life is directed, and the denial of the individual will to life. Despite his profound pessimism, Schopenhauer vehemently rejects suicide as an unworthy affirmation of the will to life by those who seek to escape rather than seek nondiscursive knowledge of Will in suffering. The only manner of self-destruction Schopenhauer finds philosophically acceptable is the ascetic saint's death by starvation. Here the individual will to life is so completely mastered as to refuse even the most basic desire for nourishment, and thereby passes into nonexistence in complete renunciation of the individual will. Schopenhauer's attitude toward suicide nevertheless embodies an inconsistency. If, as Schopenhauer believes, the aim of life is death, and death is an unreal aspect of the world as appearance, then there appears to be no justification why the philosopher should not rush headlong into it - not to affirm the will to life in an abject effort to avoid suffering, but in order to fulfill life's purpose by ending it for distinctly philosophical reasons immediately upon arriving at an understanding of the appearance-reality distinction.
In this paper I argue that the social constructionist view found in Foucault's work does not condemn one to a deterministic portrait of the 'self.' Attention to the early and late writings allows one to articulate a weak notion of autonomy even under the heavy-handed descriptions found in Foucault's early work. By recognizing autonomy as a public task, and not as a notion of freedom relegated to particular individuals, one is entitled to view autonomy as present in Foucault's work - and not merely in those writings dedicated to the 'techniques of the self.' Far from emphasizing practices of freedom, I demonstrate that we need not always think of autonomy as contained in necessary 0resistance. It is this that permits reading autonomy as a product of social construction, and not an objection to it.
R. Rorty uncouples cosmopolitanism from emancipation and rejects the latter on both phylogenetic and ontogenetic grounds. Thus: 1. There is no human nature to be emancipated, and 2. The notion of a rational, transcendental and conditioning subject (presupposed by traditional theories of emancipation) is obsolete. He preserves the idea of cosmopolitanism, which, in an effort to avoid foundationalisrn, he associates only with the development and progress of liberal societies. His cosmopolitanism relies on the distinction between persuasion and force and his preference for conversation over rational discourse. In this paper, I discuss Rorty's claims and trace residues of biologism, positivism, and behaviourism in them. By putting forward an immanent critique of Rorty's account of cosmopolitanism and emancipation, I defend a non-foundationalist notion of redemption as self-realization and propose a new justification of Rorty's distinction between force and persuasion.
In a single aphorism in The Gay Science, Nietzsche arrays "The Problem of the Artist" in a reticulated constellation. Addressing every member of the excluded grouping of disenfranchised "others," Nietzsche turns to the destitution of a god of love keyed to the self-turning absorption of the human heart. His ultimate and irrecusably tragic project to restore the innocence of becoming requires the affirmation of the problem of suffering as the task of learning how to love. Nietzsche sees the eros of art as what can teach us how to make things beautiful, lovable in the routine truth of reality: "When they are not." The stumbling block for those of us paralyzed by impotence and frozen in a technological age of anxiety, longing for being not becoming (eternal youth), is that one can never possess but can only win great health, again and again (like erotic desire), because one gives it away again and again as sacrifice or affirmation without reserve: that is to say, with erotic artistry.
Born in 1912, Walter Schulz taught philosophy at the Tubingen University from 1955 to 1978. Now Professor Emeritus there, he first gained recognition for his work on Schelling. Much of his work continues to focus on German Idealism, developing further its conception of subjectivity. His writings include Philosophy in der veranderten Welt (1972), Metaphysiks des Schwebens (1985), and Subjektivitat im nachmetaphysisschen Zeitalter (1992). The essay translated here was originally published in 1975. Schulz takes up the problem of death in an age no longer determined by the presuppositions of traditional metaphysics. The loss of this metaphysics has opened new ways to approach the topic of death-such as the medical, psychological, and sociological. Alongside these post-metaphysical perspectives, he placed those from ancient Greece and Israel which preceded the birth of metaphysics. At the heart of these post- and pre-metaphysical theories, Schulz insists, lies an understanding of death as "transitoriness." He concludes by suggesting an ethics which, informed by the idea of transitoriness, would invite a universal sympathy among all living things.
Nietzsche sees base morality and traditional philosophy as reactive, essentially predicated on negation and opposition. But is it possible to reject negation? To oppose oppositionality? This issue has been addressed by a variety of 20th century thinkers who think that the paradox is insurmountable. I use the thought of Deleuze to propose a way Nietzsche can respond to the accusation of paradox. Specifically, I believe Nietzsche proposes a set of philosophical terms that allow him to refer the question of opposition to a critical analysis of types of wills. Nietzsche attempts to show us a will that does not negate and oppose, but is rather affirmative. Its affirmation will be creative, rather than recognizing and reacting to an antecedent state of affairs or set of values. The purpose of this paper is to argue for the coherence and novelty of this conception of affirmative, noble will.
This essay argues that with respect to trends in Euro-American philosophy there has been a growing disparity between practices on the Continent and North America with respect to technoscience studies. Whereas in, particularly northern European circles, a new canon of topics and authors has risen to prominence with respect to science and technology studies, this same interest is virtually lacking in the institutional programs of North American continental circles. Reasons for the lack of interest in science and technology in North American continentalism are explored. The disparities between Europe and North America include temporal dimensions in which science and technology is read anachronistically in continental circles in North America; canonical dimensions in which different authors are read; and contextual dimensions regarding where technoscience studies occur. There are, however, problem sets such as 'realism and relativism,' 'relations of humans and non-humans,' and roles of 'textuality' which could be seen as overlapping interest areas. The essay attempts to locate and introduce the issues and authors of this 'other' continentally interesting philosophy and recommends that Euro-American philosophers in North America begin to catch up with the newer trends.